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For any initial correlated network after any kind of attack where either nodes or edges are removed,
we obtain general expressions for the degree-degree probability matrix and degree distribution.
We show that the proposed analytical approach predicts the correct topological changes after the
attack by comparing the evolution of the assortativity coefficient for different attack strategies and
intensities in theory and simulations. We find that it is possible to turn an initial assortative network
into a disassortative one, and vice versa, by fine-tuning removal of either nodes or edges. For an
initial uncorrelated network, on the other hand, we discover that only a targeted edge-removal attack
can induce such correlations.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 02.50.Cw, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
The degree-degree correlations of a network is a critical
property of the network topology. For instance, these cor-
relations, as well as the network degree distribution [1–3],
play a crucial role on the resilience of the network [4–6].
Vazquez et al. [4] studied the impact of random node fail-
ure in uncorrelated, assortative, and disassortative net-
works. They derived some general expressions to show
that the general criterion 〈k2〉/〈k〉 ≥ 2 for percolation,
derived explicitly for uncorrelated networks in [2], is not
applicable for networks with degree-degree correlations.
In [5], Noh investigated numerically the nature of the per-
colation transition in correlated networks. His numerical
results showed that disassortative networks exhibit the
same type of percolation transition as neutral networks.
Recently, Goltsev et al. [6] contradicted Noh and demon-
strated that both assortative and disassortative mixing
affect not only the percolation threshold but the critical
behavior at the percolation transition point. Their anal-
ysis showed that the critical behavior is determined by
the eigenvalues of the branching matrix and the degree-
distribution.
The relevance of degree-degree correlations goes be-
yond just the network resilience. These correlations also
have a strong impact on the network dynamical proper-
ties as, for instance, its diffusion properties. In corre-
lated complex networks, the epidemic threshold is deter-
mined by both, the degree distribution and degree-degree
probability matrix [7, 8]. However, for some particular
networks, as scale-free networks, the epidemic threshold
may not be affected by such correlations [9]. Despite this
remarkable result, the (disease) spreading properties of
most real world network are found to be extremely sensi-
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tive to degree-degree correlations [10, 11]. Along similar
lines, the removal of either node or edges can have a dra-
matic effect on the transport properties of a network as
it has been shown to occur in the worldwide airport net-
work [12]. Certainly, if several airports are shut down,
the circulation of passengers and goods will employ al-
ternative routes and airports. The overload of edges and
nodes may induce further damage in the network and
eventually a collapse of the entire transportation system.
In [12] it was shown that the robustness of the worldwide
airport network is particularly sensitive to node-node cor-
relations. Here, we will learn that the removal of either
nodes or edges affect the correlations themselves.
The degree-degree correlations of a network can be
characterized through an scalar: the assortativity (or
Pearson) coefficient [13–15]. This coefficient is zero when
the network is uncorrelated. When it is positive, it is said
that the network is assortative. In assortative networks,
most edges connect nodes that exhibit similar degree. On
the other hand, disassortative networks, characterized by
a negative coefficien, are such that high-degree nodes are
connected to low-degree nodes.
Despite the relevance of degree-degree correlations, it
has not been studied in detail how these correlations and
their associated assortativity coefficient are affected by
an attack. If we are able to predict the evolution of
the degree distribution and degree-degree correlations af-
ter an attack, we will know most relevant feature of the
distorted network such as the new percolation thresh-
old [1, 2], size of the giant component [4–6], average
path length [15], or the new epidemic threshold [7, 8].
Here, we aim at filling this gap and focus on the effects
that either a node- or an edge-removal attacks have on
the degree distribution and degree-degree correlations of
a complex network. More specifically, we derive analyt-
ical expressions for the degree distribution and degree-
degree probability matrix of a correlated network un-
der either node- or edge-removal attack. We test the
2goodness of the analytical approach by simulating ran-
dom and targeted attacks on initial networks which can
be either assortative or disassortative (or neutral). We
compare the assortativity coefficient obtained in theory
and stochastic simulations and find that the assortativ-
ity coefficient exhibits a non-trivial behavior with the at-
tack intensity. While random attacks, involving either
node or edge removal, always reduce degree-degree cor-
relations, targeted attacks can induce drastic changes in
the degree-degree probability matrix. Interestingly, we
find that such attacks can make an initial assortative net-
work, disassortative, and vice versa. For the particular
case of an initial uncorrelated network, we find that only
a targeted edge removal attack can induce correlations.
This paper is organized as follows. First we provide
a more formal definition of the problem (Sec. II) then
derive expressions for the degree distribution and degree-
degree probability matrix after a node removal attack, in
Sec. III, and after an edge removal attack, in Sec. IV.
We present a comparison between stochastic simulations
and the developed theory in Sec. V, and conclude in Sec.
VI.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Let us assume that the degree distribution of the ini-
tial network pi and its degree-degree probability matrix
pi,j are known. Our goal is to obtain the degree distribu-
tion and the degree-degree probability matrix after either
node or edge removal attacks. We refer to these probabil-
ities as p′i and p
′
i,j , respectively. Notice that the degree-
degree probability matrix contains the information about
the probability of finding an edge that connects a node
of degree i with another one of degree j, and obeys:
kmax∑
i=0
kmax∑
j=0
pi,j = 1 , (1)
kmax∑
j=0
pi,j =
ipi
〈k〉
, (2)
and for uncorrelated networks,
pi,j =
ipi
〈k〉
jpj
〈k〉
, (3)
where kmax denotes the maximum degree in the network,
and 〈k〉 =
∑
i ipi. Eq. (2) relates pi,j and pi. Similar
expressions hold for p′i and p
′
i,j .
III. IMPACT OF NODE REMOVAL ATTACKS
We consider a generic node removal attack. Let fk be
the probability by which a node of degree k is removed
from the network. Notice that 0 ≤ fk ≤ 1, and in general
∑
k fk 6= 1. This definition allows us to describe random
and targeted (or deterministic) attacks.
Any node removal attack can be thought as a process
involving two steps. The first step is to select the nodes
that are going to be removed according to the probabil-
ity distribution fk. After the selection of the nodes, we
divide the network into two subsets, one subset contains
the nodes that are going to survive (S) while the other
subset comprises of the nodes that are going to be re-
moved (R). In the second step of the attack all nodes in
subset R and all edges in S that are linked to nodes in
R are removed. We introduce the following definitions to
facilitate further reading:
nS,Si,j = pi,j〈k〉N(1− fi)(1 − fj) (4)
nS,Ri,j = pi,j〈k〉N(1− fi)fj (5)
nR,Si,j = pi,j〈k〉Nfi(1− fj) (6)
nR,Ri,j = pi,j〈k〉Nfifj , (7)
where nS,Si,j represents the number of tips – let us recall
that one edge has two tips – that start from a node of
degree i in S and are connected to a tip which is linked
to a node of degree j also located in S, and similarly for
nS,Ri,j , n
R,S
i,j and n
R,R
i,j .
When the nodes in the subset R are actually re-
moved, the degree distribution of the surviving nodes S
is changed due to the removal of edges that run between
the surviving set S and any node of the removed set R.
We focus on a node of degree j in S before the actual
removal of nodes in R. We want to know the probability
φj that one of the j edges of this node is connected to a
node in R. This probability can be expressed as:
φj =
∑
k n
S,R
j,k∑
k(n
S,R
j,k + n
S,S
j,k )
. (8)
The removal of nodes can only lead to a decrease in the
degree of a survived node. If we find a node of degree k
that has survived, it can be due to the fact that originally
its degree was k + q and k of its edges survived, while q
(q may be zero also) got removed. Hence, using Eq. (8),
we express p′k as the following binomial distribution:
p′k =
∞∑
q=k
(
q
k
)
φq−kq (1− φq)
k psq , (9)
where psq =
(1−fq)pq
1−
∑
i
pifi
.
Notice that φj becomes independent of j in two sit-
uations: a) when fk = f , and b) for uncorrelated net-
works. For fk = f (random node removal), φj = f ,
while for uncorrelated networks φj =
∑
k k pk fk/〈k〉. In
these two limiting cases, Eq.(9) reduces to the expression
derived in [16] for the degree distribution after the attack
for uncorrelated networks. This means that the degree
distribution after a random attack is independent of the
3degree-degree correlations of the initial network and only
depends on pk.
Now, we look for a transformation that allows us to go
from the initial degree-degree probability matrix to the
joint degree probability matrix of the attacked network.
We know that the new matrix has to obey, by definition,
Eq.(2), i.e.,
∑
k p
′
j,k = j p
′
j/〈k
′〉 which implies a connec-
tion between the new degree-distribution and the new
degree-degree probability matrix. Taking this into ac-
count, let us focus on an edge that connects a node of
degree j and a node of degree k in the survived network.
Before the attack, these nodes have had a degree ≥ j
and ≥ k, respectively. This means that all edges that
initially had an end connected to a node of degree equal
or larger than j, and the other end connected to a node
of degree equal or larger than k, can contribute to the
number of edges we observe after the attack connecting
nodes of degree j and k. Finally, if these two nodes are
still connected, then it is clear that the edge running be-
tween them before the attack has also survived. All this
implies the following transformation:
p′j,k =
kmax∑
u=j
kmax∑
v=k
H(u, j, φu) ·H(v, k, φv) · ξu,v , (10)
where to ease the notation we have introduced
H(x, y, ω) =
(
x− 1
y − 1
)
ωx−y(1− ω)y−1 , (11)
and defined ξu,v = n
S,S
u,v /
∑
m,l n
S,S
m,l , which is the prob-
ability of finding an edge connecting a node of degree
u and a node of degree v, both in the subset S, before
the attack. It can be shown, through Eq. (10), that for
an initial uncorrelated network that obeys Eq. (3), ei-
ther a random or a targeted node removal attack leads
to p′j,k = j p
′
j k p
′
k/〈k
′〉2 (Appendix A). Thus, a node re-
moval attack can never correlate an initially uncorrelated
network. On the other hand, if the initial network ex-
hibits correlations, a node removal attack will have an
impact on the correlations [21].
IV. IMPACT OF EDGE REMOVAL ATTACKS
In order to analyze the impact of link removal on the
degree-distribution, we need first to establish a relation-
ship between the degree-distribution p′k after the attack
and the initial degree distribution pk and degree-degree
probability matrix pi,j . Let us represent by fi,j the prob-
ability that an edge, connecting nodes of degree i and j,
is removed during the attack. The link removal attack
is a two step process whereby first the edges to be re-
moved are selected (with probability fi,j) and then all
the selected edges are removed at once. It is important
to note that unlike node removal attacks, link removal
attack does not divide the network into two subsets.
For an undirected network, an edge between any two
nodes u and v can be thought of as a set of two edges:
from u to v and from v to u. Hence, the total number
of edges in this “undirected” network is given by N〈k〉,
where N is the number of nodes in the network, 〈k〉 is the
mean degree, and the total number of edges from i-degree
nodes and to j-degree nodes is given by N〈k〉pi,j . Out
of these many edges, N〈k〉pi,jfi,j edges will be removed.
This helps us to derive the total number of removed edges
whose one end is connected to an i-degree node, while the
other end is connected to any other degree node, which
can be expressed as
Ei = N〈k〉
∑
j
pi,jfi,j . (12)
The quantity Ei represents the number of tips which con-
nect to i-degree nodes that are removed. This quantity
can be used to compute φ˜i, the probability that a node
of degree i loses a tip, which reads:
φ˜i =
Ei
iNpi
. (13)
The removal of edges can only lead to a decrease in the
degree of a node. If we find a node of degree k after
the attack, it can be due to the fact that originally its
degree was q, with k ≤ q ≤ kmax, and k of its edges sur-
vived, while q−k got removed. Thus, from the Eqs. (12)
and (13), and assuming that the edges of a node are in-
dependent, we obtain the following expression for p′k:
p′k =
kmax∑
q=k
(
q
k
)
φ˜q−kq (1− φ˜q)
k pq . (14)
Notice that for fi,j = f , φ˜q becomes independent of q.
On the other hand, for uncorrelated networks, φ˜q reduces
to
∑
k k pk fq,k/〈k〉.
In the following we derive an expression for the degree-
degree probability matrix p′j,k after the attack. Given an
edge removal attack characterized by fi,j , we look for a
transformation that allows us to move from the initial
degree-degree probability matrix pj,k to the new proba-
bility matrix p′j,k, which has to obey Eqs. (1) and (2).
If we find an edge connecting nodes of degree j and k
in the network after the attack, we can assume that be-
fore the attack the edge was connecting nodes of degree
u and v, with j ≤ u ≤ kmax and k ≤ v ≤ kmax. Since
the selected edge is not removed from the network, then
this means that the initial u-degree node lost u− j edges
(from its initial u − 1 edges not linked to the analyzed
edge), while the v degree node lost v − k edges. As re-
sult of this process, the node degree after the attack is j
and k, respectively. In consequence, using the probability
φ˜k given by Eq. (13), we can express the degree-degree
probability matrix after the edge removal attack as:
p′j,k =
kmax∑
u=j
kmax∑
v=k
H(u, j, φ˜u) ·H(v, k, φ˜v) · pu,v, (15)
4where H(x, y, ω) is again given by Eq. (11). It can be
shown that for an initial uncorrelated network that obeys
Eq. (3), a random edge removal attack leads, according
to Eq. (15), to p′j,k = j p
′
j k p
′
k/〈k
′〉2 (Appendix B). This
means that the random removal of edges cannot corre-
late an initial uncorrelated network. On the contrary, a
targeted edge removal attack can induce correlations in
an initial uncorrelated network. The proof is given in
Appendix B. If, on the other hand, the initial network
is correlated, both a random or a targeted edge removal
attack will affect the network correlations.
V. COMPARISON BETWEEN THEORY AND
STOCHASTIC SIMULATIONS
We test the goodness of the analytical approach by
comparing the degree distribution and the degree-degree
probability matrix obtained from the theory and from
stochastic simulations. The comparison is performed
through the assortativity coefficient r that is defined as
follows [17]:
r =
∑
j,k j k pj,k −
(∑
j,k
(j+k)
2 pj,k
)2
∑
j,k
(j2+k2)
2 pj,k −
(∑
j,k
(j+k)
2 pj,k
)2 . (16)
The following convention is used: “ r ” refers to the initial
assortativity coefficient, while “r′” to the coefficient after
the attack. Thus, r′ is a function of p′j,k, see Eqs. (10)
and (15).
The comparison has been performed on Erdos-Renyi,
bimodal, and scale-free networks, obtaining in all cases
an excellent agreement between theory and simulations.
To illustrate the goodness of theory, we choose to present
only results on scale-free networks given their broad ap-
plicability. The various attacks were simulated on initial
assortative and disassortative scale-free networks. Thus,
we refer to these initial networks as IDN (Initial Dis-
assortative Network) and IAN (Initial Assortative Net-
work). These networks were generated using the method
described in [18] and their details are given below.
1. IDN is characterized by a negative assortativity
coefficient r = −0.168, and a power-law degree
distribution of exponent −2.3. The first and sec-
ond moments of the degree-distribution are 〈k〉 =
3.2348 and 〈k2〉 = 28.9350, respectively, and maxi-
mum degree 37.
2. IAN is characterized by a positive assortativity co-
efficient r = 0.275, and a power-law degree distri-
bution of exponent −2.3. The first and second mo-
ments of the degree-distribution are 〈k〉 = 2.3760
and 〈k2〉 = 11.2140, respectively, and maximum
degree 23.
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FIG. 1: Impact of node removal attacks on IDN . (a) and (b)
show the degree distribution of the attacked network after the
random removal of 60% of its nodes, in (a), and the removal
of the 2% of the highest degree nodes, in (b). The solid lines
correspond to Eq. (9). (c) and (d) show the assortativity
coefficient r′ as function of the attack intensity I for random
and targeted attack, respectively. The solid curves correspond
to the evaluation of Eq. (16) using Eq. (10).
A. Results for node removal
We tested two node removal attacks [19]: a random
attack, sometimes also referred to as failure, where fk =
f , and a targeted attack given by:
fk =


1 for k > kcut
q for k = kcut
0 for k < kcut
. (17)
The first attack defines a situation in which randomly
selected nodes are removed from the network, indepen-
dent of their degree. The second attack defines a targeted
attack procedure where all nodes having degrees higher
than kcut are removed. The attack intensity I of a node-
removal attack is given by the fraction of nodes that are
removed from network. For fk = f , I = f . For the
attack given by Eq. (17), I = q · pkcut +
∑kmax
k=kcut+1
pk.
Figs. 1 (a) and (b) and Fig. 2 (a) and (b) show that
for an initial either disassortative or assortative network,
Eq. (9) predicts the correct deformed degree distribution.
On the other hand, Figs. 1 (c) and 2 (c) indicate that
for a random attack Eq. (10) allows us to compute the
correct assortativity coefficient for both, disassortative
and assortative initial networks. From the figures it can
be inferred that random removal of nodes induces ran-
domness, and consequently the assortativity coefficient
r′ of IDN increases as the attack intensity is increased,
while for IAN , r′ decreases. In both cases, r′ → 0 as
I → 1. In case of a targeted attack, the network cor-
relations exhibit a complex, non trivial behavior with
ups and downs as the attack intensity is increased, see
Figs. 1 (d) and 2 (d). This complex behavior is also pre-
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FIG. 2: Impact of node removal attacks on IAN . (a) and (b)
show the degree distribution of the attacked network after the
random removal of 40% of its nodes, in (a), and the removal
of the 2% of the highest degree nodes, in (b). The solid lines
correspond to Eq. (9). (c) and (d) show the assortativity
coefficient r′ as function of the attack intensity I for random
and targeted attack, respectively. The solid curves correspond
to the evaluation of Eq. (16) using Eq. (10).
dicted by Eq. (10) which indicates that the observed
complex functional form of r′ with I is not due to arbi-
trary fluctuations that result from a poor statistics. Be-
low we offer a tentative, more physical interpretation of
these non trivial curves.
A targeted node-removal attack affects firstly high de-
gree nodes. For an initial disassortative network (IDN)
the removal of few of the highest degree nodes leads to an
homogenization of the network. Nodes tend to have sim-
ilar degree, and so most connection occur among nodes
that exhibit similar degree. Consequently, the assortative
coefficient increases, becoming even positive; see max-
imum in Fig. 1(d). Further removal of nodes has the
opposite effect. This is arguably due to the fact that
after most hubs in the system have been removed, a tar-
geted attack is not very different than a random attack,
and so r′ decreases. This latter observation can be eas-
ily understood if we imagine a simpler scenario where all
nodes have the same degree. Then, the removal of nodes
necessarily induces heterogeneity and r′ tends to 0. Inter-
estingly, r′(I) in Fig. 1(d) is more complex than what we
have just described. Particularly intriguing is the fact
that for large I values r′ seems to tend asymptotically
to a small but negative value. Though the arguments
provided above do not account for all the details of the
curve, they constitute a tentative explanation for the non
monotonic shape of the curve and the observed transition
from disassortative to assortative.
The non-monotonic behavior observed in Fig. 2(d) for
an initial assortative network, IAN , can be understood
along similar lines. The removal of few high-degree
nodes, leads to a dramatic reduction of the number of
edges running among high-degree nodes. Consequently,
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FIG. 3: Impact of edge removal attacks on IDN . (a) and (b)
show the degree distribution of the attacked network after the
random removal of 60% of its edges, in (a), and the targeted
removal of 20% edges given by Eq. (18) using α = 0.5, in (b).
The solid lines correspond to Eq. (14). (c) shows the assor-
tativity coefficient r′ as function of the random edge attack
intensity I , while (d) corresponds to r′, due to the removal
of 3% of edges, as function of the targeted attack parameter
α. The solid curves correspond to the evaluation of Eq. (16)
using Eq. (15).
the statistical weight of those connections running be-
tween high and low-degree nodes can become remarkably
important. Fig. 2(d) clearly shows that targeted node
removal can even make the assortative coefficient for an
IAN become negative.
Fig. 1 and 2 show that despite of the complexity of
the process, Eq. (10) is able to predict the correct degree-
degree correlations of the network after the attack. Devi-
ations between the theory and simulations are observed
when some simulation attacks started to lead to heavily
fragmented networks. As the number of simulation at-
tacks is increased, the agreement between Eq. (10) and
the numerically obtained r′ seems to become systemati-
cally better. More importantly, we have learned that a
targeted node removal attack can be used to transform
an initial assortative network into a disassortative, and
vice versa (see Figs. 1(d) and 2(d)).
B. Results for edge removal
We tested two attacks for edge removal: a random
attack, with fi,j = f , and a targeted attack [20] of the
form:
fi,j = β (i j)
α , (18)
where β is a normalization constant and α is another
constant that controls the type of attack (see also [12]).
Notice that for the same number of removed edges, differ-
ent values of α induce different effects. For instance, with
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FIG. 4: Impact of edge removal attacks on IAN . (a) and (b)
show the degree distribution of the attacked network after the
random removal of 40% of its edges, in (a), and the targeted
removal of 20% edges given by Eq. (18) using α = 0.5, in (b).
The solid lines correspond to Eq. (14). (c) shows the assor-
tativity coefficient r′ as function of the random edge attack
intensity I , while (d) corresponds to r′, due to the removal
of 5% edges, as function of the targeted attack parameter
α. The solid curves correspond to the evaluation of Eq. (16)
using Eq. (15).
α = 1, the attack tends to affect those edges connecting
high degree nodes, while for α = −1 edges running be-
tween low degree nodes are more likely to be removed.
For targeted edge removal attack, we have conducted at-
tack simulations using as control parameter the (attack)
exponent α, while keeping constant the number of edges
to be removed, i.e. I = const. For random edge-removal
attacks, the attack intensity I is simply I = f , while for
a targeted edge-removal attack, I =
∑
i,j pi,jfi,j .
Figs. 3 (a) and (b), and Figs. 4 (a) and (b) show
that Eq. (14) suffices to predict the new degree distri-
bution after edge removal attacks for either a disassorta-
tive (Fig. 3) or assortative (Fig. 4) initial network. From
Fig. 3 (c) and Fig. 4 (c), we learn that random edge re-
moval, fi,j = f , induces randomness, with the assortativ-
ity coefficient getting closer to 0 as the attack intensifies.
In summary, a random attack, involving either node or
edge removal, always weakens the degree-degree correla-
tions exhibited by the initial network.
A targeted attack, on the other hand, can introduce
new correlations in the network. Figs. 3 (d) and 4 (d)
show the impact of targeted edge removal on the degree-
degree probability matrix of IDN and IAN with respect
to the attack parameter α for a given value of I. For an
initial disassortative network, IDN , as the attack param-
eter α changes from 0 to −1, the removal of edges running
between low-degree nodes gets intensified. The removal
of these edges leads to the removal of low-degree nodes
from the network. This implies an increase in the pro-
portion of edges connecting low-degree and high-degree
nodes in the deformed network. At the same time, the
Node-Removals Edge-Removals
Initial Network Random Targeted Random Targeted
IDN RC IC RC IC
IAN RC IC RC IC
IUN N N N IC
TABLE I: The table summarize the obtained results. Starting
from an initial network which can be disassortative (IDN),
assortative (IAN), or uncorrelated (IUN), we indicate whether
the corresponding attack induces correlations (IC), removes
correlations (RC), or whether it does not affect the network
correlations (N).
attack reduces the degree of a low-degree nodes, which in-
duces a further decrease of r′ This dynamics explains the
decrease of r′ observed in Figs. 3 (d) as we move from
α = 0 to −1. For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the attack affects those
edges running between high-degree nodes. Hence, the
fraction of edges connecting high-degree and low-degree
nodes increases as α → 1 and r′ gets more negative, as
observed in Figs. 3 (d). In summary, for a disassortative
initial network (IDN) any targeted removal of edges at
constant I (either with α > 0 or α < 0) seems to in-
crease negative correlations, making the network more
disassortative.
For an initial assortative network, IAN , we observe
that as α is increased from 0 to 1, r′ decreases, Figs. 4 (d).
Arguably, this is due to the removal of some of the abun-
dant edges connecting high-degree nodes, which brings in
randomness. On the other hand, as α is decreased from
0 to −1, several edges connecting low degree nodes are
removed, which leads to the removal of low degree nodes.
As the network becomes more homogeneous, r′ exhibits
an increase, Figs. 4 (d). Though not shown here, by
increasing the attack intensity, a targeted edge removal
attack can be used to transform an IAN into a disas-
sortative one. While the opposite could be possible, we
have not observed it numerically. Despite the apparent
complexity of process, Figs. 3 (c) and (d), and Figs. 4 (c)
and (d) show that Eq. (15) is able to predict the cor-
relation changes due to the different attacks for either
disassortiative or assortative initial networks.
Table I summarizes the results obtained for both, edge
and node removal attacks. Numerical and analytical re-
sults for the particular case of an initial uncorrelated net-
work are given in the appendix.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have derived an analytical framework that has al-
lowed us to understand the impact of node- and edge-
removal attacks on the correlations of complex networks.
Stochastic simulation results indicate that the derived
theory provides a good estimate of the degree distribu-
tion and degree-degree probability matrix under node-
7and edge-removal attacks for both, assortative and dis-
assortative initial networks. The main insights obtained
from this work are:
1. Random node- or edge-removals always introduce
randomness in the deformed network which tends
to become uncorrelated as the attack intensity is
increased.
2. Targeted node- or edge-removals can strongly af-
fect the network correlations to the point that an
initial assortative network can turn into disassorta-
tive, and vice versa.
3. If the initial network is uncorrelated, only a tar-
geted edge removal attack can introduce correla-
tions. All other attacks defined in this paper keep
the network uncorrelated.
These results, beyond their academic interest, are rel-
evant from a practical point of view. As briefly ex-
plained in the introduction, degree-degree correlations
control several network properties as robustness [4–6],
path length [15], and diffusive properties [7, 8, 11, 12],
among many others. As we have shown here, targeted
as well as unintentional removal of either nodes or edges
affect the degree-degree correlations. Consequently, the
above mentioned properties – robustness, path length,
etc – are also affected. Since most of these properties
are known functions of p′i and p
′
i,j , the expressions de-
rived here – Eqs. (9), (10), (14), and (15) – are useful
tools that allow us to recompute all these quantities for
a correlated network subject to any type of attack.
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Appendix A: Node-removal attack on an initial
uncorrelated network
Here, we show that for an initial uncorrelated network,
a node-removal attack cannot induce correlations. The
probability pi,j of the initial network is then given by
Eq. (3). In consequence, the probability that a node
loses a tip, given by Eq. (8), becomes independent of its
degree: φj = φ. Eq. (3) also implies that the probability
ξu,v of finding an edge between nodes of degree u and v
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FIG. 5: Change in assortativity of an initial uncorrelated net-
work due to (a) random node-removal, (b) targeted node-
removal, (c) random edge-removal, and (d) targeted edge-
removal attack. In (d), the attack intensity corresponds to
the removal of 3% of edges. Notice that only a targeted edge-
removal attack is able to affect the assortativity coefficient.
in set S becomes
ξu,v =
u pu v pv (1− fu) (1− fv)∑
u
∑
v u pu v pv (1− fu) (1− fv)
. (A1)
The average degree of the deformed network, 〈k′〉 =∑
k k p
′
k, and can then be expressed as
〈k′〉 =
kmax∑
k=0
k
kmax∑
q=k
(
q
k
)
φq−k(1− φ)k
pq(1 − fq)∑
k pk(1− fk)
=
kmax∑
q=0
q pq (1− fq) (1− φ)∑
k pk(1 − fk)
·
q∑
k=0
(
q − 1
k − 1
)φq−k(1− φ)k−1
=
∑kmax
q=0 q pq (1 − fq) (1− φ)∑
k pk(1− fk)
(A2)
Using φu = φv = φ and Eqs. (A1) and (A2), Eq. (10)
reduces to
p′i,j =
i p′i j p
′
j[
(1−φ)
∑
k
k pk (1−fk)∑
k
pk (1−fk)
]2
=
i p′i j p
′
j
〈k′〉2
. (A3)
This implies that under any kind of node-based attack,
an initially random network remains random. This has
also been observed in simulations as shown in Figs. 5 (a)
and (b).
8Appendix B: Edge-removal attack on an initial
uncorrelated network
Here, we show that for an initial uncorrelated net-
work, a random edge-removal attack cannot induce cor-
relations, while, on the contrary, a targeted edge-removal
attack can do it. For an initial uncorrelated network, pi,j
is given by Eq. (3), and then the probability that a node
of degree i loses a tip, given by Eq. (13), reduces to:
φ˜i =
∑
j j pj fi,j
〈k〉
. (B1)
Using Eq. (3) in Eq. (15), the probability that an edge
exists between nodes of degree i and j in the deformed
network can be expressed as
p′i,j =
i j
〈k〉2
kmax∑
u=i
u
i
H(u, i, φ˜u) pu
kmax∑
v=j
v
j
H(v, j, φ˜v) pv ,(B2)
where H is given by Eq. (11). In the case of random
edge attack, fi,j = f , and so Eq. (B1) becomes φ˜u = f .
Using this in Eq. (B2) we get
p′i,j =
i p′i j p
′
j
[
∑
k k pk (1− f)]
2
=
i p′i j p
′
j
〈k′〉2
. (B3)
This shows that under random edge removal attack an
initially uncorrelated network remains uncorrelated, see
Fig. 5(c). In case of targeted edge removal, φ˜i does not
become degree independent and Eq. (B2) does not get
reduced to Eq. (3). This implies that correlations have
crept in the attacked network as Fig. 5 (d) confirms.
Therefore, it is only through a targeted edge removal
attack that degree-degree correlations can be induced in
an initial uncorrelated network.
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